Birchfield v. North Dakota:Why the United States Supreme Court Should Rely on Riley v. California to Hold that Criminalizing a Suspect’s Refusal to Consent to a Warrantless Blood Test Violates the Fourth Amendment by Lamparello, Adam & Swann, Cynthia
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice
Volume 22 | Issue 1 Article 5
3-2016
Birchfield v. North Dakota:Why the United States
Supreme Court Should Rely on Riley v. California
to Hold that Criminalizing a Suspect’s Refusal to
Consent to a Warrantless Blood Test Violates the
Fourth Amendment
Adam Lamparello
Indiana Tech Law School
Cynthia Swann
Indiana Tech Law School
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal
Procedure Commons, Fourth Amendment Commons, and the Human Rights Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice at Washington & Lee
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice by an
authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Adam Lamparello and Cynthia Swann, Birchfield v. North Dakota:Why the United States Supreme Court Should Rely on Riley v. California
to Hold that Criminalizing a Suspect’s Refusal to Consent to a Warrantless Blood Test Violates the Fourth Amendment, 22 Wash. & Lee J.




Birchfield v. North Dakota: Why the United 
States Supreme Court Should Rely on Riley v. 
California to Hold that Criminalizing a 
Suspect’s Refusal to Consent to a Warrantless 
Blood Test Violates the Fourth Amendment 
Adam Lamparello* 
Cynthia Swann∗∗ 
Table of Contents 
  Introduction .................................................................................. 108 
 II. Laws Authorizing Warrantless Blood Tests Regardless  
  of the Circumstances, Are Unreasonable and Therefore  
  Violate the Fourth Amendment ................................................... 112 
  A. N.D. Century Code § 39-20-01 Impermissibly  
   Establishes a Per Se Exception to the Warrant Requirement 114 
  B. Law Enforcement Officers Have Less Intrusive Means  
   at their Disposal to Determine if a Motorist is Driving  
   While Intoxicated .................................................................. 115 
 III. The Criminalization of a Motorist’s Refusal to  
  Consent to a Warrantless Blood Test Violates  
  the Fourth Amendment ................................................................ 117 
  A. Riley Provides the Framework Upon Which to  
   Invalidate N.D. Cent. Code. § 39-08-01 ............................... 117 
  B. A Case-By-Case Evaluation of Warrantless Blood  
   Testing Will Provide Guidance to Law Enforcement  
   Officers and Protect Motorists’ Privacy Rights .................... 119 
                                                                                                     
 * Associate Dean of Experiential Learning and Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana 
Tech Law School. B.A., University of Southern California, J.D., Ohio State University 
College of Law, LL.M., New York University School of Law.  
 ∗∗ Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana Tech Law School. B.A., State University of 
New York at Buffalo, M.A., University of Maryland, M.A. Georgetown University, J.D., 
Georgetown University Law Center. 
108 22 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 107 (2016) 
  Conclusion ................................................................................... 121 
“In those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can 
reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without 
significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth 
Amendment mandates that they do so.”1 
Introduction 
In Birchfield v. North Dakota,2 the United States Supreme Court will 
decide whether North Dakota may criminalize the refusal to consent to a 
warrantless blood test. N.D. Century Code §§ 39-20-1 and 39-08-01 permit 
and provide in relevant part as follows, respectively: 
A chemical test, or tests, of the individual's blood, breath, or urine 
to determine the alcohol concentration or presence of other drugs, 
or combination thereof, in the individual’s blood, breath, or urine, 
at the direction of a law enforcement officer under section 39-
06.2-10.2 if the individual is driving or is in actual physical 
control of a commercial motor vehicle; or . . . a chemical test, or 
tests, of the individual’s blood, breath, or urine to determine the 
alcohol concentration or presence of other drugs, or combination 
thereof, in the individual's blood, breath, or urine, at the direction 
of a law enforcement officer under section.3 
*** 
An individual who operates a motor vehicle on a highway or on 
public or private areas to which the public has a right of access 
for vehicular use in this state who refuses to submit to a chemical 
test, or tests, required under section . . . is guilty of an offense 
under this section.4 
On its face, N.D. Century Code § 39-20-1 authorizes law enforcement 
to conduct warrantless blood tests in every case, regardless of whether law 
enforcement officers are faced with exigent circumstances, and N.D. 
                                                                                                     
 1. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561 (2013) (citing McDonald v. United 
States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)) (“We cannot . . . excuse the absence of a search warrant 
without a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the 
exigencies of the situation made [the search] imperative.”).  
 2. No. 14-1468, consolidated with Bernard v. Minnesota, No. 14-1470. 
 3. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-1 (emphasis added). 
 4. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01. 
BIRCHFIELD V. NORTH DAKOTA 109 
Century Code § 39-08-01 criminalizes in every case a motorist’s refusal to 
consent to such tests.  
In this Article we argue that both provisions violate the Fourth 
Amendment.5 First, in violation of McNeely, N.D. Century Code §§ 39-20-
1 establishes a per se exception to the warrant requirement and forecloses a 
case-by-case evaluation of whether a warrantless blood test, given the facts 
of a particular case, is reasonable. Second, N.D. Century Code § 39-20-1 
provides law enforcement officers with less intrusive means—breathalyzer 
and urine tests—to obtain the same evidence.6 Finally, given that 
technological advances in warrant procurement procedures often give law 
enforcement ample time to obtain a warrant without risking dissipation in a 
motorist’s blood-alcohol level,7 there is little, if any, need to conduct a 
warrantless blood test of every motorist suspected of driving while 
intoxicated. For these reasons, N.D. Century Code § 39-20-1 fails to pass 
constitutional muster. Additionally, since the statutory provision upon 
which the crime for refusal is predicated (N.D. Century Code § 39-20-1) 
fails to withstand constitutional scrutiny, a refusal to consent under § 39-08-
01 is unconstitutional as well.  
However, the Court cannot rely solely on McNeely in analyzing 
N.D. Century Code §§ 39-20-1 and 39-08-01 because in McNeely the four-
member plurality did not address the constitutionality of criminalizing a 
motorist’s refusal to consent, although the plurality suggested that civil 
penalties and inferences of guilt are permissible.8 Thus, it remains an open 
question whether criminal penalties for refusing warrantless blood tests (or 
breathalyzer and urine tests) are constitutionally permissible, particularly in 
contexts, unlike Birchfield, where the underlying statute is constitutional. 
This Article posits that the Court’s reasoning in Riley offers a useful model 
for answering this question, and that it supports the conclusion that N.D. 
Century Code § 39-08-01 violates the Fourth Amendment.  
                                                                                                     
 5. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
 6. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-1 (outlining what the stated statute provides). 
 7. See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1562 (describing how technological advances impact 
DUI investigations). 
 8. See id. at 1566 (noting that “[s]uch laws impose significant consequences when a 
motorist withdraws consent; typically the motorist's driver's license is immediately 
suspended or revoked, and most States allow the motorist's refusal to take a BAC test to be 
used as evidence against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution”). 
110 22 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 107 (2016) 
By way of background, in Riley the Court unanimously held that, 
absent exigent circumstances, warrantless searches of cell phones incident 
to arrest are unreasonable and therefore violate the Fourth Amendment.9 
The outcome in Riley can be traced to Chimel v. California,10 in which the 
Court held that warrantless searches incident to arrest were permissible to 
protect officers’ safety and prevent arrestees from destroying evidence.11 As 
a result, law enforcement officers were permitted to conduct warrantless 
searches of an arrestee’s person and areas within an arrestee’s reach.12 In 
subsequent cases, however, the Court relied on Chimel’s bright-line rule to 
uphold searches that did not implicate officer safety and evidence 
preservation. For example, in New York v. Belton,13 the Court held that law 
enforcement officers could search a passenger compartment incident to 
arrest even though the suspect was in police custody and there was no risk 
that evidence would be destroyed.14 In Arizona v. Gant,15 the Court also 
relied on Chimel to uphold searches of a passenger compartment if officers 
reasonably believed that it contained evidence related to the crime of 
                                                                                                     
 9. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014). By way of background, in Riley 
the Court held that the two justifications underlying searches incident to arrest—protecting 
officer safety and preserving evidence—did not justify warrantless searches of cell phones 
absent exigent circumstances. Noting that cell phones have “immense storage capacity” and 
hold “for many Americans, ‘the privacies of life, the Court held, for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, that cell phones are qualitatively and quantitatively different than searches of finite 
objects, such as a plastic container or passenger compartment. See id. at 2489, 2493–95 
(quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886)). Writing for the majority, Chief 
Justice Roberts explained: 
First, a cell phone collects in one place many distinct types of information—an 
address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a video—that reveal much 
more in combination than any isolated record. Second, a cell phone's capacity 
allows even just one type of information to convey far more than previously 
possible. The sum of an individual's private life can be reconstructed through a 
thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; the same 
cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet. Third, 
the data on a phone can date back to the purchase of the phone, or even earlier. 
A person might carry in his pocket a slip of paper reminding him to call Mr. 
Jones; he would not carry a record of all his communications with Mr. Jones for 
the past several months.  
Id. 
 10. See generally Chimel v. Calfornia, 359 U.S. 752 (1969). 
 11. Id. at 763. 
 12. Id. at 762–63. 
 13. See generally New York. v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
 14. Id. at 462–63. 
 15. See generally Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
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arrest.16 The Court’s holdings in Belton and Gant demonstrated that the 
bright-line rule adopted in Chimel had been expanded to such a degree that 
the original justifications for the search incident to arrest doctrine were little 
more than an afterthought.  
In Riley, the Court ended this charade, holding that warrantless cell 
phone searches did not implicate, and were entirely divorced from, the 
original justifications underlying the search incident to arrest doctrine. 
Thus, absent exigent circumstances, law enforcement officers could not 
search a cell phone without a warrant.17 In so holding, Court curtailed a 
decades-old and unprincipled expansion of the search incident to arrest 
doctrine in which searches of passenger compartments, plastic containers, 
and other objects were upheld even though officer safety and evidence 
preservation were not implicated. What’s more, the Court reached this 
result even though arrestees, like citizens operating motor vehicles on 
public roads, enjoy a reduced expectation of privacy.18  
In Birchfield, the Court should apply the same reasoning. Although 
courts have repeatedly held that the interest in deterring drunk driving 
supports laws that compel motorists, by virtue of operating a motor vehicle, 
to implicitly consent to field, breathalyzer, and urine tests, and impose civil 
penalties or draw inferences of guilt from a motorist’s refusal, here North 
Dakota goes a step further by making the refusal an independent crime. To 
make matters worse, since the underlying statutory provision (N.D. Century 
Code § 39-20-01) authorizes warrantless blood tests in every case, the 
withholding of consent is always an offense, even in cases where such 
searches ultimately are deemed unreasonable, thus rendering the 
withholding of consent lawful. Finally, given the availability of breath and 
urine tests, law enforcement officer have alternative and less intrusive 
                                                                                                     
 16. Id. at 343. 
 17. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (stating under what 
circumstance a law enforcement officer may search a cell phone without a warrant). 
 18. See id. at 2588 (“The fact that an arrestee has diminished privacy interests does not 
mean that the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture entirely. Not every search ‘is 
acceptable solely because a person is in custody.’” (quoting Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 
1958–79 (2013))); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 379 (1976) (noting that “the 
traditional expectation of privacy in an automobile is significantly less than the 
traditional expectation of privacy associated with the home”); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 
583, 590 (1974) (“One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its 
function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of 
personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public 
thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.”); cf. United States 
v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953–54 (2012) (holding that the use of a GPS tracking device to 
monitor a motorist’s movements for twenty-eight days violated the Fourth Amendment).  
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means at their disposal to arrest suspects for driving while intoxicated and 
therefore vindicate the interest in protecting public safety. For these 
reasons, criminalizing a refusal to consent represents an unprecedented 
expansion of the implicit consent doctrine in the same way that searches of 
passenger compartments and plastic containers represented an 
unprecedented expansion of the search incident to arrest doctrine. 
Accordingly, N.D. Century Code § 39-08-01 violates the Fourth 
Amendment.  
At bottom, North Dakota is attempting to achieve through legislation 
what it could not accomplish under the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, by 
authorizing warrantless blood tests in every case, North Dakota is 
attempting to evade the holding in McNeely, which requires a case-by-case 
evaluation of the constitutionality of warrantless searches. Additionally, 
North Dakota seeks to criminalize a suspect’s refusal to submit to such test, 
even though, in some cases, that refusal will be lawful if the search itself is 
unreasonable. As in Riley, the Court in Birchfield can put an abrupt end to 
this practice by holding that law enforcement may not perform warrantless 
blood tests unless officers are faced with truly exigent circumstances. In the 
absence of exigent circumstances, the message to states that seek to force 
motorists, under threat of criminal prosecution, to undergo warrantless 
blood tests should be simple—get a warrant.19 Part II examines N.D. 
Century Code § 39-20-01 and explains why it should be invalidated. Part III 
discusses N.D. Century Code § 39-08-01 and, analogizing to Riley, argues 
that it exceeds law enforcement investigatory authority under the implied 
consent doctrine and thus violates the Fourth Amendment. 
II. Laws Authorizing Warrantless Blood Tests Regardless of the 
Circumstances, Are Unreasonable and Therefore Violate the Fourth 
Amendment  
Reasonableness is the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis.20 
Whether a search is unreasonable “depends on all of the circumstances 
surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure 
                                                                                                     
 19. See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1563 (2013) (holding that “adopting 
the State's per se approach . . . might well diminish the incentive for jurisdictions ‘to pursue 
progressive approaches to warrant acquisition that preserve the protections afforded by the 
warrant while meeting the legitimate interests of law enforcement’”) (citation omitted). 
 20. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482 (“As the text makes clear, ‘the ultimate touchstone of 
the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 
403 (2006))). 
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itself,” and entails “balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.”21 Moreover, given “the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness 
inquiry,” the Court “evaluate[s] each case of alleged exigency based on its 
own facts and circumstances.”22 As the Court noted in McNeely, 
“[n]umerous police actions are judged based on fact-intensive, totality of 
the circumstances analyses rather than according to categorical rules, 
including in situations that are more likely to require police officers to make 
difficult split-second judgments.”23 Against this backdrop, at least one court 
has held that “a warrantless blood test, performed without consent, is 
presumptively unreasonable unless the state actors involved had probable 
cause and exigent circumstances sufficient to justify it.”24  
As set forth below, by its clear terms, N.D. Century Code § 39-20-1 
creates a per se exception to the warrant requirement, thus precluding the 
fact-intensive, case-by-case reasonableness analysis required of searches in 
particular contexts. In addition, N.D. Century Code § 39-20-1 provides law 
enforcement officers with alternative and less intrusive means by which to 
establish probable cause that a motorist is intoxicated.  
                                                                                                     
 21. Skinner v. Railway Lab. Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) 
(quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 656 (1979)); see Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 
843, 848 (2006) (“[W]e ‘examin[e] the totality of the circumstances’ to determine whether 
a search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” (quoting United States 
v. Knights, 534 U.S 112, 118 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted))).  
 22. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1559 (quoting Go–Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 
U.S. 344, 357 (1931)), abrogated by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009); see Riley v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (noting “the exigent circumstances exception 
requires a court to examine whether an emergency justified a warrantless search in each 
particular case”) (emphasis added); Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406 (noting that officers' entry 
into a home to provide emergency assistance was “plainly reasonable under the 
circumstances”); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001) (concluding that a 
warrantless seizure of a person to prevent him from returning to his trailer to destroy hidden 
contraband was reasonable “[i]n the circumstances of the case before us” due to exigency); 
see generally Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996). 
 23. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1564.  
 24. Marshall v. Columbia Lea Regional Hosp., 345 F.3d 1157, 1172 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(emphasis added). The Court’s decision in South Dakota v. Neville, in which it held that 
warrantless blood searches do not violate the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, is inapposite. 459 U.S. 553 (1983). First, Neville addressed the 
constitutionality of warrantless blood tests in an entirely different context. Second, in 
Neville, law enforcement did not have alternative and less intrusive means at their disposal 
(breathalyzer and urine tests) by which to determine if a motorist is driving under the 
influence of alcohol. 
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A. N.D. Century Code § 39-20-01 Impermissibly Establishes a Per Se 
Exception to the Warrant Requirement 
In a variety of contexts, the Court has refused to adopt a per se 
exception to the warrant requirement.25 In McNeely, a four-member 
plurality of the Court specifically rejected the state’s attempt to create such 
an exception.26 Writing for the plurality, Justice Sotomayor held that the 
natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood—the most common reason given 
to justify warrantless blood tests—does not support a per se exigency 
exception.27 Furthermore, the fact that “some circumstances will make 
obtaining a warrant impractical such that the dissipation of alcohol from the 
bloodstream will support an exigency justifying a properly conducted 
warrantless blood test,” is only “a reason to decide each case on its facts . . . 
not to accept the “considerable overgeneralization” that a per se rule would 
reflect.”28 For example, in situations where “the warrant process will not 
significantly increase the delay before the blood test is conducted because 
an officer can take steps to secure a warrant while the suspect is being 
transported to a medical facility by another officer,” there could be no 
“plausible justification for an exception to the warrant requirement.”29 As 
such, “[w]hile the desire for a bright-line rule is understandable, the Fourth 
Amendment will not tolerate adoption of an overly broad categorical 
approach that would dilute the warrant requirement in a context where 
significant privacy interests are at stake.”30 
                                                                                                     
 25. See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 391–96 (1997) (rejecting a per 
se exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for felony drug investigations based on 
presumed exigency, and requiring instead evaluation of police conduct “in a particular 
case”); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948) (holding that “[w]e cannot . . . 
excuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing by those who seek exemption 
from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation made [the search] 
imperative”). 
 26. See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1564 (“While the desire for a bright-line rule is 
understandable, the Fourth Amendment will not tolerate adoption of an overly broad 
categorical approach that would dilute the warrant requirement in a context where significant 
privacy interests are at stake.”). 
 27. See id. at 1563, 1568 (holding that “the natural dissipation of alcohol in the 
bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a 
blood test without a warrant” and that “whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving 
suspect is reasonable “must be determined case by case based on the totality of the 
circumstances”). 
 28. Id. at 1555 (quoting Richards, 520 U.S. at 393).  
 29. Id. at 1561.  
 30. Id. at 1564. 
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In addition, evaluating the reasonableness of warrantless blood tests on 
a case-by-case basis is consistent with the practices of many states. Several 
states, for example, “lift restrictions on nonconsensual blood testing if law 
enforcement officers first obtain a search warrant or similar court order.”31 
In addition, “a majority of States either place significant restrictions on 
when police officers may obtain a blood sample despite a suspect's refusal 
(often limiting testing to cases involving an accident resulting in death or 
serious bodily injury) or prohibit nonconsensual blood tests altogether.”32 
For these reasons, the portion of N.D. Century Code § 39-20-01 authorizing 
warrantless and nonconsensual blood tests cannot withstand constitutional 
scrutiny. Of course, this is not to say warrantless blood tests will never be 
permissible, or that dissipation of blood alcohol level will never be a 
permissible basis upon which to conduct such a test. It is to say, however, 
that their lawfulness should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to 
determine if they comport with Fourth Amendment requirements.33  
B. Law Enforcement Officers Have Less Intrusive Means at their Disposal 
to Determine if a Motorist is Driving While Intoxicated 
Since N.D. Century Code § 39-20-01 authorizes law enforcement 
officers to perform less intrusive tests (breathalyzer and urine) to establish 
probable cause that a motorist is driving while intoxicated, there is little, if 
any, need to subject every motorist to a warrantless blood test. In Nelson v. 
City of Irvine,34 the Ninth Circuit invalidated a strikingly similar law 
permitting warrantless tests of a motorist’s blood, breath, or urine.35 In so 
holding, the Ninth Circuit explained that “[w]hen a DUI 
arrestee consents to undergo a breath or urine test, the government has 
available to it an effective alternative to a blood test as a means of obtaining 
the same evidence.”36 Furthermore, “breath and urine tests are equally 
                                                                                                     
 31. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1566 (2013).  
 32. Id. 
 33. See id. at 1559 (holding that “[w]e apply this ‘finely tuned approach’ to Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness in this context because the police action at issue lacks ‘the 
traditional justification that . . . a warrant . . . provides’”) (quoting Atwater v. Lago Vista, 
532 U.S. 318, 347 n.16 (2016)). 
 34. See generally Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F. 3d 1196 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 35. See id. at 1207–08 (outlining an instance in which the 9th Circuit invalidated a law 
permitting the testing of a motorist’s blood, breath, or urine without a warrant).  
 36. Id. at 1201.  
116 22 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 107 (2016) 
effective as a blood test in determining whether a suspect has violated the 
DUI law.”37 
Although equally effective, breath and urine tests are far less intrusive 
than blood tests. In Skinner, the Court stated: 
Unlike blood tests, breath tests do not require piercing the skin and 
may be conducted safely outside a hospital environment and with a 
minimum of inconvenience or embarrassment. Further, breath tests 
reveal the level of alcohol in the employee's bloodstream and nothing 
more . . . [B]reath tests reveal no other facts in which the employee has 
a substantial privacy interest.38  
The Riley Court recognized that a cell phone, unlike a passenger 
compartment or plastic container, “collects in one place many distinct types 
of information—an address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a 
video—that reveal much more in combination than any isolated record.”39 
Additionally, in McNeely, the four-member plurality emphasized that 
“[s]tates have a broad range of legal tools to enforce their drunk-driving 
laws and to secure BAC evidence without undertaking warrantless 
nonconsensual blood draws.”40 For example, “all 50 States have adopted 
implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of operating a 
motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC testing if they are 
arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense.”41  
At bottom, McNeely and Nelson stand for the proposition that when 
law enforcement officers have alternative means available to establish 
probable cause that a suspect was operating a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated, there is no need to conduct a warrantless, nonconsensual, and 
far more intrusive search (i.e., a blood test).42 For this reason, “[n]o matter 
                                                                                                     
 37. Id. 
 38. Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 625 (1989) (emphasis added). 
 39. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014).  
 40. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1566 (2013).  
 41. Id. 
 42. See, e.g., Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F. 3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(“Consent to a breathalyzer test may very well have reduced to insignificance the defendants' 
need to extract [defendant’s] blood.”) (quoting Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 842, 846 (9th 
Cir. 1991). Additionally, in McNeely the Court has identified various circumstances where 
an exigency renders it impractical to obtain a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. 
Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976) (finding law enforcement were in “hot pursuit” of a 
fleeing suspect); see Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509–10 (1978) (entering a burning 
building to put out a fire and investigate its cause). Exigencies are also based on the need to 
prevent the imminent destruction of evidence. See, e.g. generally, Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 
291, 296 (1973); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40–41 (1963) (plurality opinion). As the 
Court held in McNeely, those circumstances are not present where law enforcement takes a 
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how serious the offense, the availability of an equally effective, consensual 
method of obtaining the evidence conclusively renders use of 
the nonconsensual method unreasonable.”43 Put simply, absent a 
compelling need to administer a warrantless blood test, there can be no 
exigency.44 For these reasons, warrantless blood tests, like warrantless cell 
phone searches, should be prohibited unless law enforcement officers are 
faced with exigent circumstances. 
III. The Criminalization of a Motorist’s Refusal to Consent to a Warrantless 
Blood Test Violates the Fourth Amendment 
Given that N.D. Century Code § 39-20-01 fails to withstanding 
constitutional scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment, the Court should hold 
that a suspect’s refusal to consent under N.D. Century Code § 39-08-01 
likewise violates the Fourth Amendment. In so holding, the Court should 
analogize to Riley and conclude that warrantless blood tests constitute an 
unprecedented expansion of the implied consent doctrine. 
A. Riley Provides the Framework Upon Which to Invalidate N.D. Cent. 
Code. § 39-08-01 
The parallels between Riley and Birchfield are striking and the analysis 
articulated by the Court in Riley offers an elegant model for both 
conducting the necessary balancing of privacy rights and public safety, 
while also providing clear guidance to law enforcement in handling DWI 
investigations. The link with Riley and the rule it articulates is a logical one 
and allows the Court to hold that that the original justifications underlying 
the implied consent doctrine—deterring drunk driving and protecting public 
safety—do not support a wholesale exception for warrantless blood test and 
certainly not the criminalization of a refusal to consent to such tests. As in 
                                                                                                     
warrantless and nonconsensual blood test of a motorist suspected of driving while 
intoxicated.  
 43. See Hammer, 932 F.2d at 852 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (noting that, “[i]f the 
suspect requests a breath or urine test and it will do the job just as well, it must be used in 
lieu of a blood test-even where the suspected crime is murder in the first degree”).  
 44. See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (noting that exigent 
circumstances are present “when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law 
enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment”).  
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Riley, where the Court held that the search incident to arrest doctrine did 
not permit law enforcement to conduct warrantless searches irrespective of 
threats to officer safety or the need to preserve evidence, the implied 
consent doctrine should not be construed to mean that officers can always 
conduct warrantless blood tests regardless of the need to obtain evidence of 
intoxication. Indeed, in Riley the Court was cognizant that the holdings in 
Belton and Gant had rendered searches incident to arrest nearly limitless 
and, in response, established categorical limits to protect an arrestees’ 
admittedly reduced privacy rights. Importantly, warrantless cell phone 
searches not only failed to implicate officer safety and evidence 
preservation, but they constituted a far more severe infringement on 
personal privacy rights.45 Of course, the Court did not hold that warrantless 
cell phone searches were never justified, but it did adopt a case-by-case 
balancing test that carefully weighed the necessity of such searches with an 
arrestee’s privacy rights.  
Although implied consent laws were not at issue in Riley, the Court’s 
reasoning, as well as the rule adopted, should be applied to warrantless 
blood tests. Unlike breathalyzer or urine tests, which can accurately 
ascertain a motorist’s blood alcohol level, warrantless blood tests, like cell 
phone searches, are far more intrusive and have the potential to reveal 
information in which a motorist has a substantial and objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy (e.g., the presence of prescription drugs). 
Furthermore, just as arrestees retain significant privacy interests in the 
contents of a cell phone despite having a reduced expectation of privacy on 
public roadways, motorists also retain a substantial privacy interest in their 
bodily integrity, particularly where alternative search methods are available 
to ensure that law enforcement’s interest in deterring drunk driving is not 
hindered.46 In fact, as the McNeely Court noted, “we never retreated . . . 
                                                                                                     
 45. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014). Justice Roberts stated as 
follows: 
[T]here is an element of pervasiveness that characterizes cell phones but not 
physical records. Prior to the digital age, people did not typically carry a cache 
of sensitive personal information with them as they went about their day. Now it 
is the person who is not carrying a cell phone, with all that it contains, who is 
the exception. According to one poll, nearly three-quarters of smart phone users 
report being within five feet of their phones most of the time, with 12% 
admitting that they even use their phones in the shower.  
 46. See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1565 (2013) (“[T]he fact that people 
are “accorded less privacy in . . . automobiles because of th[e] compelling governmental 
need for regulation . . . does not diminish a motorist's privacy interest in preventing an agent 
of the government from piercing his skin.” (quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 
(1985))).  
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from our recognition that use of th[e] compelling governmental need for 
regulation . . . does not diminish a motorist's privacy interest in preventing 
an agent of the government from piercing his skin.”47 To hold otherwise 
would give law enforcement nearly unbridled authority to conduct 
unnecessary and unreasonable searches despite having alternative—and less 
invasive—means by which to procure the same evidence.  
The table below summarizes the parallels between the search incident 
to arrest and implied consent doctrines. 
B. A Case-By-Case Evaluation of Warrantless Blood Testing Will Provide 
Guidance to Law Enforcement Officers and Protect Motorists’ Privacy 
Rights 
Evaluating the reasonableness of warrantless blood tests on a case-by-
case basis will appropriately balance the need of law enforcement to protect 
the public with a suspect’s privacy interest. To begin with, law enforcement 
officers will continue to have at their disposal a number of tools, such as 
field, breath, and urine tests, to establish probable cause that a suspect is 
driving while intoxicated. Thus, law enforcement will not be hindered in its 
ongoing efforts to protect public safety and deter drunk driving. As the 
                                                                                                     
 47. Id.; see Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985) (holding that “invasions of 
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McNeely plurality explained, “[w]e are aware of no evidence indicating that 
restrictions on nonconsensual blood testing have compromised drunk-
driving enforcement efforts in the States that have them.”48 In fact, “field 
studies in States that permit nonconsensual blood testing pursuant to a 
warrant have suggested that, although warrants do impose administrative 
burdens, their use can reduce breath-test-refusal rates and improve law 
enforcement's ability to recover BAC evidence.”49  
Second, technological advances substantially increase the likelihood 
that officers will have sufficient time to procure a warrant before blood 
alcohol levels begin to dissipate. As the Court noted in McNeely, “a 
majority of States allow police officers or prosecutors to apply for search 
warrants remotely through various means, including telephonic or radio 
communication, electronic communication such as e-mail, and video 
conferencing.”50 In addition, “jurisdictions have found other ways to 
streamline the warrant process, such as by using standard-form warrant 
applications for drunk-driving investigations.”51 Thus, adopting a per se 
exigency exception would disregard “the current and future technological 
developments in warrant procedures.”52 Furthermore, a case-by-case 
approach will incentivize law enforcement to carefully consider whether the 
circumstances justify dispensing with the warrant requirement, rather than 
give law enforcement freewheeling authority to take a suspect’s blood at 
any time—and for whatever reason.53  
Third, a case-by-case approach will enable officers to take warrantless 
blood samples where they are faced with a true exigency.54 To say that such 
exigencies may occur, however, does not mean that they always will occur. 
Without evaluating each case on its merits, the likelihood that citizens’ will 
                                                                                                     
 48. Id. at 1567. 
 49. Id. at 1566–67 (citing Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710–11 
(2011); NHTSA, Use of Warrants for Breath Test Refusal: Case Studies 36–38 (No. 810852, 
Oct. 2007)). 
 50. Id. at 1562. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. at 1563 (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 156 P.3d 771, 779 (Utah 2007)). 
 53. See id. (noting that a per se rule “might well diminish the incentive for 
jurisdictions to pursue progressive approaches to warrant acquisition that preserve the 
protections afforded by the warrant while meeting the legitimate interests of law 
enforcement”).  
 54. See id. (explaining that “longer intervals may raise questions about the accuracy of 
the calculation,” such that exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood sample may 
arise in the regular course of law enforcement due to delays from the warrant application 
process). 
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suffer substantial—and unreasonable—infringements on their privacy 
would increase, even though the benefit to law enforcement and the public, 
particularly given the availability of breath, urine, and field sobriety tests, 
would not. This is precisely what would result from a per se exigency 
exception to the warrant requirement, and precisely why the portion of N.D. 
Century Code § 39-20-01 authorizing law enforcement to conduct 
warrantless and nonconsensual blood tests fails to pass constitutional 
muster. 
Conclusion 
Although the interest in deterring drunk driving and protecting the 
public cannot be overstated, the importance of protecting privacy rights is 
far too often understated. In an era where technological advancements 
enable law enforcement to investigate criminal activity in a manner the 
Founders could not possibly foresee, few would doubt that the benefits of 
technology also bring grave threats to individual and collective liberty. 
However, as courts struggle to balance privacy rights with the investigatory 
powers that new technology enables, they must not overlook the more 
conventional threats to privacy, as present in Birchfield, that often lurk 
under the Fourth Amendment radar. States cannot—and should not—be 
allowed to weaken privacy protections through laws, such as N.D. Century 
Code §§ 39-20-1 and 39-08-01, compelling motorists, under threat of 
criminal prosecution, to consent to warrantless blood tests that, at least in 
some cases, are neither necessary nor reasonable. If N.D. Century Code 
§§ 39-20-1 and 39-08-01 are upheld, the Court will send a message that 
states can circumvent the Fourth Amendment with legislation that 
admittedly achieves worthy policy objectives, yet does so at the expense of 
core constitutional protections. In Riley, the Court’s decision recognized 
this fact, and implicit in its holding was the admonition that the objective of 
serving the public good, such as by deterring drunk driving, must not be 
achieved through procedures that make the public less free and the 
Constitution less relevant.  
